Topic description / abstract:

Could a brainless biological entity be conscious? These and other mind/body modal claims – involving modal concepts of possibilty, necessity, and counterfactuality – have long been interpreted in terms of logical or physical possibility. Yet to bring new biological and psychological knowledge to bear on our assessments of their truth, such claims must be reinterpreted in terms of biological modality. In this talk I will introduce the problem of interpreting mind/body modal claims, the nature of biological modality, and the impact of reinterpreting these claims in terms of biological modality on future empirical research and current debates about mind/body problems, including the possibility of conscious artificial devices.

Biographical note:

Carrie Figdor is a professor of philosophy at the University of Iowa and an honorary professor of philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. Her main research involves developing the philosophical foundations of psychology within a phylogenetic conceptual framework. Her 2018 book, Pieces of Mind: the proper domain of psychological predicates (OUP) won an Honorable Mention for the 2019 APA Marc Sanders Book Prize, and her papers have appeared in Philosophy of Science, The Journal of Philosophy, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Brains, Behavior and Evolution, Mind & Language, Philosophical Studies, and other leading journals.