Signaling and information transfer can be observed on many levels of biological organizations. Such situations may involve a number of strategic aspects. Agents must, for instance, use signals in the same systematic way in order to facilitate coordinated behavior. These strategic aspects make it possible to apply evolutionary game theory in analyzing situations involving signaling or information transfer. The talk will concentrate on two simple game theoretic models: signaling games and a one-way flow model of information transmission. Some game theoretic properties of those models will be discussed. I will also present some results on convergence to states of communication and to states of efficient information transfer for adaptive dynamics of evolution and learning.
Simon Huttegger studied philosophy, history, and mathematics at the University of Salzburg (MA, 2002, with a thesis on subjective probabilities). He spent the academic year 2004/05 at the University of California at Irvine. His research concentrates on evolutionary game theory and its applications in philosophy, particularly in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of biology, epistemology, and social philosophy. In his dissertation, "Language and Coordination: Evolution, Social Learning, and the Explanation of Meaning," he studies adaptive dynamics applied to interactions.