This talk explores the relationship, in evolution, between animal cognition and animal body, with special attention to the role of space. Does the availability of a suitably complex cognitive architecture constrain (or drive) the elaboration of the animal form and its capacities to interact with the environment? Does having anatomical capacities to interact with the environment in certain ways constrain (or drive) the elaboration of cognition? If so, how do these constraining or driving relationships operate? If not, what would this tell us about the nature of cognition, and what would be left of cognition’s embodiment?
(2012) Implicit and explicit goal directedness. Erkenntnis (Online First, May).
(2012) The environment, from a behavioral perspective. In: The Environment: Philosophy, Science, and Ethics (Kabasenche WP, O’Rourke M, Slater MH, eds). MIT Press.
Michael Trestman studied philosophy and obtained his PhD from the University of California, Davis in 2010. He was a postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Utah from 2010 to 2011, and is currently a research associate at UC Davis.